Abstract-This paper endeavors to present a novel framework for the generic structure of a verifier-based password authenticated Three-Party Encrypted Key Exchange (3P-EKE) protocol which yields more efficient protocol than the ones knew before. A previous framework presented by Archana and Premchand is more secured against all types of attacks like password guessing, replay, pre-play, man-in-the-middle attack etc. But unfortunately, this protocol does not solve the problem of a server compromise. These proofs help as inspiration to search for another framework. The framework we offer produces more efficient 3P-EKE protocol, and, in addition, delivers perceptive clarification about the existing attacks that do not solve in the previous framework. Moreover, it allows direct change from a class of verge private-key encryption to a hybrid (symmetric & Asymmetric) one without significant overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
A vital job of cryptography is to guard the confidentiality of messages transferred over the unsecured network. To provide security, messages can be encrypted by using a key (secret information) so that an intruder cannot decode the message. However, encoding the messages may not be only the solution, because an intruder may take the most active role as the network is open and reachable. We may need to change the key according to the session to establish a secure communication through the unsecured open network.
Consecutively, a password-authenticated two-party encrypted key exchange (2P-EKE) protocols are used to exchange a session key based on a low-entropy password. In this network, each party who wants to communicate needs to memorize a low-entropy password, which implies high maintenance of passwords. Due to this drawback, a password-authenticated three-party encrypted key exchange (3P-EKE) protocols has its demand as on date. According to Ding & Hoster [1] , many of such 3P-EKE protocols suffer from any one of the three types of password guessing attacks. An intruder can guess the correct password by continuously trying until he succeeds, which is known as password guessing attack. An Ideal password authenticated key exchange protocol should satisfy the security requirements like, Mutual Authentication, Resistant to password guessing attacks, Session Key (SK) security, Resistant to Trivial Attack, Resistant to Pre-play Attack, Resistant to Replay Attack, Resistant to Man-in-the-middle Attack, Server spoofing security, Perfect forward secrecy, backward secrecy, Known-Key Security, etc.
Based on the low entropy passwords shared between a user and a server, the password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols are classified into two types. They are:
A. Symmetric model
As the name implies, symmetric (identical) low entropy password shared between a Trusted Party (server) and a user in establishing a secure session key. If a Trusted Party is compromised, an intruder will get succeed in performing an attack on the legitimate user.
B. Asymmetric model
As the name implies, the password distribution is asymmetric in nature; i.e., a user will share the different knowledge (a verifier) about the low entropy password with the Trusted Party in establishing a secure session key. If a Trusted Party is compromised, the password table does not reveal the direct information about the password. In this way, a server spoofing is avoided.
Henceforth, the design of a novel framework which is smart in establishing a secure session key with less computational overhead; which prove to be secure against the attacks like password guessing, a server spoofing and also provide mutual authentication, Backward Secrecy, and Forward Secrecy is the need of the hour. This paper endeavors to propose a novel framework for establishing a secure session key based on an asymmetric model by using PCLA keys. PCLA is a new public key [2] . Further, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: Related works is discussed in section II. In section III, we listed notations used in the proposed protocol. A framework for the proposed protocol is described in section IV. Security Analysis of the proposed protocol is done in section V. Finally, we made concluding remarks in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK Diffie-Hellman (1976) [3] key exchange protocol is suffered from a man-in-the-middle attack due to the lack of an authentication. To assure a good access control, many applications require a robust client authentication. In such scenario, password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols have their own identity.
Bellovin and Merritt (1992) [4] have first proposed password-based authenticated encrypted key exchange protocol for the two-party network. But, due to the server compromise (server hacking: e.g., In 2012, more than million LinkedIn passwords are stolen) this protocol no longer proved to be secure. Hence, to eliminate such a problem he proposed an improvement over it known as Augmented EKE protocol (1993) [5] , where a server instead of storing the actual passwords, it stores the verifiers of the passwords which prevents from a server compromise but it does not solve the problem of off-line dictionary attacks.
Subsequently, Gong et al.(1993) [6] proposed a threeparty password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using a server's public key, where the clients are given a risk to verify and keep the public key safely. Many improvements proposed by various researchers in terms of a security and computational efficiency [7, 8, 9, 10] . Abdalla et al. (2005) [11] proposed a ‗provable secure' one-time password-based authentication and key exchange (OPKeyX) technology for grid computing; where a user changes the password from one session to another session to eliminate the problem of password sniffing. Lin et al. (2008) [12] proposed an efficient verifier-based password-authentication key exchange protocol by using elliptic curve cryptography. Unfortunately, Yang et al. (2011) [13] showed the flaws of Lin et al. protocol and proposed an improvement over the Efficient verifier-based password-authentication key exchange protocol via elliptic curves.
A Novel ECC-3PEKE protocol is proposed by Chang [18] cryptanalyzed the PSRJ protocol and to overcome an attack she proposed an improvement over the existing one by using reduced modular exponentiation operations. Successively, an impersonation attack has been shown on the ECC-3PEKE protocol by Shirisha Tallapally (2010) [19] . Next, Archana et al. (2012) [20] showed detectable online password guessing the attack on PSRJ protocol.
Also, Kulkarni et al.(2007) [21] proposed a novel key exchange protocol based on verifier-based password authentication for three parties; where each client instead of storing the direct password itself it computes a oneway hash function on each password and stores the corresponding result in a server's password [24] is more secured against all types of attacks like password guessing, replay, pre-play, man-in-themiddle attack etc. But unfortunately, this protocol does not solve the problem of a server compromise. These proofs help as inspiration to search for another framework which eliminates the problems, may occur in the previous framework.
III. NOTATIONS
The list of notations along with their descriptions used in this paper is given in Table 1 
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section endeavors to propose a novel verifierbased password-authenticated 3P-EKE protocol using the PCLA keys. PCLA is a new public key cryptosystem based on the logarithmic approach proposed by Archana et al. More details about this algorithm (PCLA) are given in the reference paper [2] .The proposed protocol has been divided into three stages. They are:
A. Initialization Stage
At this 1 st stage, the clients who want to communicate each other have to register with Trusted Party in advance.
The procedure for registration is as follows:
Step Then Trusted Party stores the verifiers in its password verifier's table. The detail of the initialization stage is depicted in Fig.1 . 
B. Key Agreement Stage
In this 2 nd stage of the protocol, the actual procedure for session key agreement begins. The protocol executes as per the following steps of the protocol.
Step Step KA2: Upon receiving the credentials from client- The detail of key agreement stage is depicted in Fig.2 . 
C. Key Computation Stage
In order to compute a secure session key, this stage accomplishes to begin with the verification of the Trusted Party in a smart way.
Step KC1: Upon receiving the credentials from a Trusted Party, client-A decrypts EP Keypr (M b REtp mod p) by using the PCLA public key of Trusted Party i.e., DP Keypu Step KC2: Upon receiving the incoming credentials F SK (Id b , SK) and F SK (Id a , SK) from client-A and client-B respectively, they verify each other and can confirm that the mutual session key is SK=( M b REtp ) REa (mod p) = ( M a REtp ) REb (mod p). The detail of key computation stage is illustrated in Fig.3 .
D. Password Change Mechanism
If any one of the client (say Client-A) suspects a ‗leak of information', then it invokes a password change mechanism of our proposed protocol, which is helpful in providing backward secrecy. The steps in this mechanism are as follows:
Step PC1: Client-A preserves the session key SK from the previous session.
Step PC2: Client-A, first encrypts the session key SK by using PCLA public key Key pu of Trusted Party. Next, i.e., Trusted Party: Accepted/Denied. The following security requirements are satisfied by the proposed protocol; which proves that the proposed protocol is not only efficient but also secure.
A. Resistant to an off-line dictionary attack
An attacker Eve-E may try to mount off-line password guessing attack to guess the password. She intercepts {Id a , Id b , Id tp , {EP Keypu (Pwd a ),V A }, E Pwda (M a  r a ), h tp (Pwd a  M a ), F Katp (M a )} and may guess a password to extract (M a r a ), but it is impossible for her to get M a until trapdoor ‗tp' is known, which is known only to Trusted Party. This implies that she cannot verify the hash value F Katp (M a ) which ascertains an offline password guessing attack on the proposed protocol is impossible.
Hence, the proposed protocol is resistant to off-line dictionary attack.
B. Resistant to server spoofing attack
Assume an intruder Eve-E succeeds in getting the password table of Trusted Party. Since only the verifier V of clients is stored in password table, Eve-E cannot mimic the client and compute SK.
Hence, the proposed protocol is resistant to a server spoofing attack.
C. Provides the mutual authentication
The proposed protocol promotes the mutual authentication and realizes the session key security to a great extent. The following are the scenarios where the mutual authentication can be proved. Hence, the mutual authentication is provided by the proposed protocol.
D. Provides backward secrecy
The proposed protocol can provide backward secrecy, where compromise of Pwd a will not lead to the compromise of NewPwd a . Assume, a client-A suspects a ‗leak of information' to Eve-E, then immediately client-A request to Trusted Party to change its password from Pwd a to NewPwd a. Let us assume, subsequently Eve-E intercepted the password change request, i.e., {Id a, Id tp, EP Keypu Hence, the backward secrecy is provided by the proposed protocol.
E. Provides the forward secrecy
The session key is computed as follows: SK= (M b REtp ) REa (mod p)=(M a REtp ) REb (mod p). If the Eve-E gets {EP Keypr (M b REtp mod p)} or {EP Keypr (M a REtp mod p)}, then in order to obtain the session key, she should know the public key of Trusted Party and RE b or RE a . The session keys generated in different sessions are independent since RE a and RE b are randomly chosen by client-A and client-B respectively. This indicates that Eve-E cannot obtain previous session keys even if she obtains the session key used in this run.
Hence, the forward secrecy is provided by the proposed protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel verifier-based password authenticated 3P-EKE protocol using PCLA keys, which provides perceptive justification about the existing attacks that do not solve in the previous framework. That is, our proposed protocol is proved to be secure against offline dictionary attacks and server spoofing attack. Further, we have also proved that our protocol provides mutual authentication, backward secrecy and also forward secrecy.
